Enable secure boot only after encrypting flash

This prevents a device from being bricked in case when both secure boot & flash encryption are enabled and encryption gets interrupted during first boot. After interruption, all partitions on the device need to be reflashed (including the bootloader).

List of changes:
* Secure boot key generation and bootloader digest generation logic, implemented inside function esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable(), has been pulled out into new API esp_secure_boot_generate_digest(). The enabling of R/W protection of secure boot key on EFUSE still happens inside esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable()
* Now esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable() is called only after flash encryption process completes
* esp_secure_boot_generate_digest() is called before flash encryption process starts
This commit is contained in:
Anurag Kar
2019-04-04 15:25:22 +05:30
parent a9425cd045
commit 62b0d51c02
4 changed files with 145 additions and 33 deletions

View File

@@ -478,24 +478,71 @@ void bootloader_utility_load_boot_image(const bootloader_state_t *bs, int start_
// Copy loaded segments to RAM, set up caches for mapped segments, and start application.
static void load_image(const esp_image_metadata_t* image_data)
{
/**
* Rough steps for a first boot, when encryption and secure boot are both disabled:
* 1) Generate secure boot key and write to EFUSE.
* 2) Write plaintext digest based on plaintext bootloader
* 3) Generate flash encryption key and write to EFUSE.
* 4) Encrypt flash in-place including bootloader, then digest,
* then app partitions and other encrypted partitions
* 5) Burn EFUSE to enable flash encryption (FLASH_CRYPT_CNT)
* 6) Burn EFUSE to enable secure boot (ABS_DONE_0)
*
* If power failure happens during Step 1, probably the next boot will continue from Step 2.
* There is some small chance that EFUSEs will be part-way through being written so will be
* somehow corrupted here. Thankfully this window of time is very small, but if that's the
* case, one has to use the espefuse tool to manually set the remaining bits and enable R/W
* protection. Once the relevant EFUSE bits are set and R/W protected, Step 1 will be skipped
* successfully on further reboots.
*
* If power failure happens during Step 2, Step 1 will be skipped and Step 2 repeated:
* the digest will get re-written on the next boot.
*
* If power failure happens during Step 3, it's possible that EFUSE was partially written
* with the generated flash encryption key, though the time window for that would again
* be very small. On reboot, Step 1 will be skipped and Step 2 repeated, though, Step 3
* may fail due to the above mentioned reason, in which case, one has to use the espefuse
* tool to manually set the remaining bits and enable R/W protection. Once the relevant EFUSE
* bits are set and R/W protected, Step 3 will be skipped successfully on further reboots.
*
* If power failure happens after start of 4 and before end of 5, the next boot will fail
* (bootloader header is encrypted and flash encryption isn't enabled yet, so it looks like
* noise to the ROM bootloader). The check in the ROM is pretty basic so if the first byte of
* ciphertext happens to be the magic byte E9 then it may try to boot, but it will definitely
* crash (no chance that the remaining ciphertext will look like a valid bootloader image).
* Only solution is to reflash with all plaintext and the whole process starts again: skips
* Step 1, repeats Step 2, skips Step 3, etc.
*
* If power failure happens after 5 but before 6, the device will reboot with flash
* encryption on and will regenerate an encrypted digest in Step 2. This should still
* be valid as the input data for the digest is read via flash cache (so will be decrypted)
* and the code in secure_boot_generate() tells bootloader_flash_write() to encrypt the data
* on write if flash encryption is enabled. Steps 3 - 5 are skipped (encryption already on),
* then Step 6 enables secure boot.
*/
#if defined(CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED) || defined(CONFIG_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED)
esp_err_t err;
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
/* Generate secure digest from this bootloader to protect future
modifications */
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Checking secure boot...");
err = esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable();
/* Steps 1 & 2 (see above for full description):
* 1) Generate secure boot EFUSE key
* 2) Compute digest of plaintext bootloader
*/
err = esp_secure_boot_generate_digest();
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Bootloader digest generation failed (%d). SECURE BOOT IS NOT ENABLED.", err);
/* Allow booting to continue, as the failure is probably
due to user-configured EFUSEs for testing...
*/
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Bootloader digest generation for secure boot failed (%d).", err);
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED
/* encrypt flash */
/* Steps 3, 4 & 5 (see above for full description):
* 3) Generate flash encryption EFUSE key
* 4) Encrypt flash contents
* 5) Burn EFUSE to enable flash encryption
*/
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Checking flash encryption...");
bool flash_encryption_enabled = esp_flash_encryption_enabled();
err = esp_flash_encrypt_check_and_update();
@@ -503,7 +550,23 @@ static void load_image(const esp_image_metadata_t* image_data)
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Flash encryption check failed (%d).", err);
return;
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_BOOT_ENABLED
/* Step 6 (see above for full description):
* 6) Burn EFUSE to enable secure boot
*/
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Checking secure boot...");
err = esp_secure_boot_permanently_enable();
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "FAILED TO ENABLE SECURE BOOT (%d).", err);
/* Allow booting to continue, as the failure is probably
due to user-configured EFUSEs for testing...
*/
}
#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_FLASH_ENCRYPTION_ENABLED
if (!flash_encryption_enabled && esp_flash_encryption_enabled()) {
/* Flash encryption was just enabled for the first time,
so issue a system reset to ensure flash encryption