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Move tinycrypt function
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GengYuchao
254
components/bt/porting/ext/tinycrypt/src/cmac_mode.c
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254
components/bt/porting/ext/tinycrypt/src/cmac_mode.c
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/* cmac_mode.c - TinyCrypt CMAC mode implementation */
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/*
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* Copyright (C) 2017 by Intel Corporation, All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
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*
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* - Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright notice,
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* this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* - Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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*
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* - Neither the name of Intel Corporation nor the names of its contributors
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* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
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* without specific prior written permission.
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
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* AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
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* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT OWNER OR CONTRIBUTORS BE
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* LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
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* CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF
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* SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS
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* INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN
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* CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE
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* POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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*/
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#include <tinycrypt/aes.h>
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#include <tinycrypt/cmac_mode.h>
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#include <tinycrypt/constants.h>
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#include <tinycrypt/utils.h>
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/* max number of calls until change the key (2^48).*/
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const static uint64_t MAX_CALLS = ((uint64_t)1 << 48);
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/*
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* gf_wrap -- In our implementation, GF(2^128) is represented as a 16 byte
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* array with byte 0 the most significant and byte 15 the least significant.
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* High bit carry reduction is based on the primitive polynomial
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*
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* X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1,
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*
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* which leads to the reduction formula X^128 = X^7 + X^2 + X + 1. Indeed,
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* since 0 = (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + 1) mod (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1) and since
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* addition of polynomials with coefficients in Z/Z(2) is just XOR, we can
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* add X^128 to both sides to get
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*
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* X^128 = (X^7 + X^2 + X + 1) mod (X^128 + X^7 + X^2 + X + 1)
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*
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* and the coefficients of the polynomial on the right hand side form the
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* string 1000 0111 = 0x87, which is the value of gf_wrap.
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*
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* This gets used in the following way. Doubling in GF(2^128) is just a left
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* shift by 1 bit, except when the most significant bit is 1. In the latter
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* case, the relation X^128 = X^7 + X^2 + X + 1 says that the high order bit
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* that overflows beyond 128 bits can be replaced by addition of
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* X^7 + X^2 + X + 1 <--> 0x87 to the low order 128 bits. Since addition
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* in GF(2^128) is represented by XOR, we therefore only have to XOR 0x87
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* into the low order byte after a left shift when the starting high order
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* bit is 1.
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*/
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const unsigned char gf_wrap = 0x87;
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/*
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* assumes: out != NULL and points to a GF(2^n) value to receive the
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* doubled value;
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* in != NULL and points to a 16 byte GF(2^n) value
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* to double;
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* the in and out buffers do not overlap.
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* effects: doubles the GF(2^n) value pointed to by "in" and places
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* the result in the GF(2^n) value pointed to by "out."
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*/
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void gf_double(uint8_t *out, uint8_t *in)
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{
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/* start with low order byte */
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uint8_t *x = in + (TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
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/* if msb == 1, we need to add the gf_wrap value, otherwise add 0 */
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uint8_t carry = (in[0] >> 7) ? gf_wrap : 0;
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out += (TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - 1);
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for (;;) {
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*out-- = (*x << 1) ^ carry;
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if (x == in) {
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break;
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}
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carry = *x-- >> 7;
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}
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}
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int tc_cmac_setup(TCCmacState_t s, const uint8_t *key, TCAesKeySched_t sched)
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{
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/* input sanity check: */
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if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0 ||
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key == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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}
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/* put s into a known state */
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_set(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
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s->sched = sched;
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/* configure the encryption key used by the underlying block cipher */
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tc_aes128_set_encrypt_key(s->sched, key);
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/* compute s->K1 and s->K2 from s->iv using s->keyid */
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_set(s->iv, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
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gf_double (s->K1, s->iv);
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gf_double (s->K2, s->K1);
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/* reset s->iv to 0 in case someone wants to compute now */
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tc_cmac_init(s);
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return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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}
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int tc_cmac_erase(TCCmacState_t s)
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{
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if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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}
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/* destroy the current state */
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_set(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
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return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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}
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int tc_cmac_init(TCCmacState_t s)
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{
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/* input sanity check: */
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if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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}
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/* CMAC starts with an all zero initialization vector */
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_set(s->iv, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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/* and the leftover buffer is empty */
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_set(s->leftover, 0, TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
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s->leftover_offset = 0;
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/* Set countdown to max number of calls allowed before re-keying: */
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s->countdown = MAX_CALLS;
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return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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}
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int tc_cmac_update(TCCmacState_t s, const uint8_t *data, size_t data_length)
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{
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unsigned int i;
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/* input sanity check: */
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if (s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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}
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if (data_length == 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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}
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if (data == (const uint8_t *) 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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}
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if (s->countdown == 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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}
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s->countdown--;
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if (s->leftover_offset > 0) {
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/* last data added to s didn't end on a TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE byte boundary */
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size_t remaining_space = TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - s->leftover_offset;
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if (data_length < remaining_space) {
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/* still not enough data to encrypt this time either */
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_copy(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset], data_length, data, data_length);
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s->leftover_offset += data_length;
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return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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}
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/* leftover block is now full; encrypt it first */
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_copy(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset],
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remaining_space,
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data,
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remaining_space);
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data_length -= remaining_space;
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data += remaining_space;
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s->leftover_offset = 0;
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for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
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s->iv[i] ^= s->leftover[i];
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}
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tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
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}
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/* CBC encrypt each (except the last) of the data blocks */
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while (data_length > TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
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for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
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s->iv[i] ^= data[i];
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}
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tc_aes_encrypt(s->iv, s->iv, s->sched);
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data += TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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data_length -= TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
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}
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if (data_length > 0) {
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/* save leftover data for next time */
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_copy(s->leftover, data_length, data, data_length);
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s->leftover_offset = data_length;
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}
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return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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}
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int tc_cmac_final(uint8_t *tag, TCCmacState_t s)
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{
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uint8_t *k;
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unsigned int i;
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/* input sanity check: */
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if (tag == (uint8_t *) 0 ||
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s == (TCCmacState_t) 0) {
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return TC_CRYPTO_FAIL;
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}
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if (s->leftover_offset == TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
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/* the last message block is a full-sized block */
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k = (uint8_t *) s->K1;
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} else {
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/* the final message block is not a full-sized block */
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size_t remaining = TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE - s->leftover_offset;
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_set(&s->leftover[s->leftover_offset], 0, remaining);
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s->leftover[s->leftover_offset] = TC_CMAC_PADDING;
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k = (uint8_t *) s->K2;
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}
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for (i = 0; i < TC_AES_BLOCK_SIZE; ++i) {
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s->iv[i] ^= s->leftover[i] ^ k[i];
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}
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tc_aes_encrypt(tag, s->iv, s->sched);
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/* erasing state: */
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tc_cmac_erase(s);
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return TC_CRYPTO_SUCCESS;
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}
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