secure_boot: Secure Boot V2 verify app signature on update (without Secure boot)

- ESP32 ECO3, ESP32-S2/C3/S3
This commit is contained in:
KonstantinKondrashov
2021-03-05 22:22:29 +08:00
committed by bot
parent 9de1591660
commit 95564b4687
30 changed files with 934 additions and 960 deletions

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// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include "sdkconfig.h"
#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
#include "bootloader_sha.h"
#include "bootloader_utility.h"
#include "esp_log.h"
#include "esp_image_format.h"
#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
#include "mbedtls/sha256.h"
#include "mbedtls/x509.h"
#include "mbedtls/md.h"
#include "mbedtls/platform.h"
#include "mbedtls/entropy.h"
#include "mbedtls/ctr_drbg.h"
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
static const char *TAG = "secure_boot_v1";
extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_start[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_start");
extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_end[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_end");
#define SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN 64
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
{
uint8_t digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sigblock;
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, length, digest);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Digest calculation failed 0x%x, 0x%x", src_addr, length);
return err;
}
// Map the signature block and verify the signature
sigblock = (const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *)bootloader_mmap(src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
if (sigblock == NULL) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
return ESP_FAIL;
}
err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sigblock, digest, verified_digest);
bootloader_munmap(sigblock);
return err;
}
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
{
#if !(defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C) && defined(CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED))
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Signature verification requires ECDSA & SECP256R1 curve enabled");
return ESP_ERR_NOT_SUPPORTED;
#else
ptrdiff_t keylen;
/* Note: in IDF app image verification we don't add any fault injection resistance, boot-time checks only */
memset(verified_digest, 0, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN);
keylen = signature_verification_key_end - signature_verification_key_start;
if (keylen != SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Embedded public verification key has wrong length %d", keylen);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
if (sig_block->version != 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "image has invalid signature version field 0x%08x", sig_block->version);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verifying secure boot signature");
int ret;
mbedtls_mpi r, s;
mbedtls_mpi_init(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_init(&s);
/* Extract r and s components from RAW ECDSA signature of 64 bytes */
#define ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN 32
ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&r, &sig_block->signature[0], ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN);
if (ret != 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(1), err:%d", ret);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
ret = mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&s, &sig_block->signature[ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN], ECDSA_INTEGER_LEN);
if (ret != 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Failed mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(2), err:%d", ret);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
/* Initialise ECDSA context */
mbedtls_ecdsa_context ecdsa_context;
mbedtls_ecdsa_init(&ecdsa_context);
mbedtls_ecp_group_load(&ecdsa_context.grp, MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1);
size_t plen = mbedtls_mpi_size(&ecdsa_context.grp.P);
if (keylen != 2 * plen) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Incorrect ECDSA key length %d", keylen);
ret = ESP_FAIL;
goto cleanup;
}
/* Extract X and Y components from ECDSA public key */
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ecdsa_context.Q.X, signature_verification_key_start, plen));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_read_binary(&ecdsa_context.Q.Y, signature_verification_key_start + plen, plen));
MBEDTLS_MPI_CHK(mbedtls_mpi_lset(&ecdsa_context.Q.Z, 1));
ret = mbedtls_ecdsa_verify(&ecdsa_context.grp, image_digest, ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN, &ecdsa_context.Q, &r, &s);
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verification result %d", ret);
cleanup:
mbedtls_mpi_free(&r);
mbedtls_mpi_free(&s);
mbedtls_ecdsa_free(&ecdsa_context);
return ret == 0 ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
#endif // CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECDSA_C && CONFIG_MBEDTLS_ECP_DP_SECP256R1_ENABLED
}
#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME

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// Copyright 2015-2016 Espressif Systems (Shanghai) PTE LTD
//
// Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
// you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
// You may obtain a copy of the License at
// http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
//
// Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
// distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
// WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
// See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
// limitations under the License.
#include "sdkconfig.h"
#include "bootloader_flash_priv.h"
#include "bootloader_sha.h"
#include "bootloader_utility.h"
#include "esp_log.h"
#include "esp_image_format.h"
#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
#include "esp_spi_flash.h"
#include "esp_fault.h"
#include "esp32/rom/sha.h"
#include "uECC_verify_antifault.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <string.h>
static const char *TAG = "secure_boot";
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME
extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_start[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_start");
extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_end[] asm("_binary_signature_verification_key_bin_end");
#define SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN 64
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
{
uint8_t digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN];
uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* ignored in this function */
const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sigblock;
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, length, digest);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
return err;
}
// Map the signature block
sigblock = (const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *) bootloader_mmap(src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
if(!sigblock) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "bootloader_mmap(0x%x, 0x%x) failed", src_addr + length, sizeof(esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t));
return ESP_FAIL;
}
// Verify the signature
err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sigblock, digest, verified_digest);
// Unmap
bootloader_munmap(sigblock);
return err;
}
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest)
{
uint8_t verified_digest[ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 };
return esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sig_block, image_digest, verified_digest);
}
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
{
ptrdiff_t keylen;
keylen = signature_verification_key_end - signature_verification_key_start;
if (keylen != SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_KEYLEN) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Embedded public verification key has wrong length %d", keylen);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
if (sig_block->version != 0) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "image has invalid signature version field 0x%08x", sig_block->version);
return ESP_FAIL;
}
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verifying secure boot signature");
bool is_valid;
is_valid = uECC_verify_antifault(signature_verification_key_start,
image_digest,
ESP_SECURE_BOOT_DIGEST_LEN,
sig_block->signature,
uECC_secp256r1(),
verified_digest);
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verification result %d", is_valid);
return is_valid ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
#endif // CONFIG_SECURE_SIGNED_APPS_ECDSA_SCHEME