bootloader: Add fault injection resistance to Secure Boot bootloader verification

Goal is that multiple faults would be required to bypass a boot-time signature check.

- Also strengthens some address range checks for safe app memory addresses
- Change pre-enable logic to also check the bootloader signature before enabling SBV2 on ESP32

Add some additional checks for invalid sections:

- Sections only partially in DRAM or IRAM are invalid
- If a section is in D/IRAM, allow the possibility only some is in D/IRAM
- Only pass sections that are entirely in the same type of RTC memory region
This commit is contained in:
Angus Gratton
2020-02-16 16:51:42 +11:00
committed by Mahavir Jain
parent 0dacff4df4
commit d40c69375c
21 changed files with 712 additions and 119 deletions

View File

@@ -20,8 +20,9 @@
#include "esp_image_format.h"
#include "esp_secure_boot.h"
#include "esp_spi_flash.h"
#include "esp_fault.h"
#include "esp32/rom/sha.h"
#include "uECC.h"
#include "uECC_verify_antifault.h"
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -38,10 +39,11 @@ extern const uint8_t signature_verification_key_end[] asm("_binary_signature_ver
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
{
uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN];
uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 }; /* ignored in this function */
const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sigblock;
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "verifying signature src_addr 0x%x length 0x%x", src_addr, length);
esp_err_t err = bootloader_sha256_flash_contents(src_addr, length, digest);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
return err;
@@ -54,7 +56,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
return ESP_FAIL;
}
// Verify the signature
err = esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(sigblock, digest);
err = esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sigblock, digest, verified_digest);
// Unmap
bootloader_munmap(sigblock);
@@ -62,6 +64,12 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
}
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest)
{
uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = { 0 };
return esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(sig_block, image_digest, verified_digest);
}
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_ecdsa_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
{
ptrdiff_t keylen;
@@ -79,12 +87,14 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verifying secure boot signature");
bool is_valid;
is_valid = uECC_verify(signature_verification_key_start,
is_valid = uECC_verify_antifault(signature_verification_key_start,
image_digest,
DIGEST_LEN,
sig_block->signature,
uECC_secp256r1());
uECC_secp256r1(),
verified_digest);
ESP_LOGD(TAG, "Verification result %d", is_valid);
return is_valid ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
@@ -94,6 +104,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const esp_secure_boot_sig_block
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
{
uint8_t digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
uint8_t verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}; // ignored in this function
const uint8_t *data;
/* Padding to round off the input to the nearest 4k boundary */
@@ -115,7 +126,7 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
}
const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block = (const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *)(data + padded_length);
err = esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(sig_block, digest);
err = esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(sig_block, digest, verified_digest);
if (err != ESP_OK) {
ESP_LOGE(TAG, "Secure Boot V2 verification failed.");
}
@@ -124,16 +135,16 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature(uint32_t src_addr, uint32_t length)
return err;
}
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest)
esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_rsa_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature_t *sig_block, const uint8_t *image_digest, uint8_t *verified_digest)
{
uint8_t efuse_trusted_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}, sig_block_trusted_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}, verified_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
uint8_t efuse_trusted_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0}, sig_block_trusted_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
secure_boot_v2_status_t r;
memcpy(efuse_trusted_digest, (uint8_t *)EFUSE_BLK2_RDATA0_REG, DIGEST_LEN); /* EFUSE_BLK2_RDATA0_REG - Stores the Secure Boot Public Key Digest */
if (!ets_use_secure_boot_v2()) {
ESP_LOGI(TAG, "Secure Boot EFuse bit(ABS_DONE_1) not yet programmed.");
/* Generating the SHA of the public key components in the signature block */
bootloader_sha256_handle_t sig_block_sha;
sig_block_sha = bootloader_sha256_start();
@@ -155,4 +166,4 @@ esp_err_t esp_secure_boot_verify_signature_block(const ets_secure_boot_signature
return (r == SBV2_SUCCESS) ? ESP_OK : ESP_ERR_IMAGE_INVALID;
}
#endif
#endif