RFC 9190 requires protected result indication to be used with TLSv1.3,
so do not allow EAP-TLS to complete successfully if the server does not
send that indication.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
While the drafts for RFC 9190 used a separate Commitment Message term,
that term was removed from the published RFC. Update the debug prints to
match that final language.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
The previously used references were pointing to an obsoleted RFC and
draft versions. Replace these with current versions.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <quic_jouni@quicinc.com>
Recognize the explicitly defined Commitment Message per
draft-ietf-emu-eap-tls13-13 at the conclusion of the EAP-TLS with TLS
1.3.
Signed-off-by: Alexander Clouter <alex@digriz.org.uk>
EAP-TLS with TLS 1.3 uses an empty application data record from the
server to indicate end of the exchange, so EAP-TLS peer will need to
check for this special case and finish the exchange with an empty
EAP-TLS (ACK) so that the server can send out EAP-Success.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Allow an additional context value to be passed to TLS exporter as
specified in RFC 5705 section 4.
This does not yet implement it for the internal TLS implementation.
However, as currently nothing uses context yet, this will not break
anything right now. WolfSSL maintainers also stated that they are not
going to add context support yet, but would look into it if/when this is
required by a published draft or a standard.
Signed-off-by: Ervin Oro <ervin.oro@aalto.fi>
Reduce the amount of time keying material (MSK, EMSK, temporary private
data) remains in memory in EAP methods. This provides additional
protection should there be any issues that could expose process memory
to external observers.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The label strings used for deriving Key_Material with TLS v1.3 were
changed, so update the implementation to match the new values.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
The EAP session cannot be marked fully completed on sending Client
Finished with TLS v1.3 since the server may still send NewSessionTicket
before EAP-Success.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
With TLS v1.3, the Finished message from the client can require
fragmentation. Postpone key derivation and marking of the EAP session
fully completed until all the fragments of that last message are sent to
avoid losing all the subsequent fragments.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
This adds support for optional functionality to validate server
certificate chain in TLS-based EAP methods in an external program.
wpa_supplicant control interface is used to indicate when such
validation is needed and what the result of the external validation is.
This external validation can extend or replace the internal validation.
When ca_cert or ca_path parameter is set, the internal validation is
used. If these parameters are omitted, only the external validation is
used. It needs to be understood that leaving those parameters out will
disable most of the validation steps done with the TLS library and that
configuration is not really recommend.
By default, the external validation is not used. It can be enabled by
addingtls_ext_cert_check=1 into the network profile phase1 parameter.
When enabled, external validation is required through the CTRL-REQ/RSP
mechanism similarly to other EAP authentication parameters through the
control interface.
The request to perform external validation is indicated by the following
event:
CTRL-REQ-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:External server certificate validation needed for SSID <ssid>
Before that event, the server certificate chain is provided with the
CTRL-EVENT-EAP-PEER-CERT events that include the cert=<hexdump>
parameter. depth=# indicates which certificate is in question (0 for the
server certificate, 1 for its issues, and so on).
The result of the external validation is provided with the following
command:
CTRL-RSP-EXT_CERT_CHECK-<id>:<good|bad>
It should be noted that this is currently enabled only for OpenSSL (and
BoringSSL/LibreSSL). Due to the constraints in the library API, the
validation result from external processing cannot be reported cleanly
with TLS alert. In other words, if the external validation reject the
server certificate chain, the pending TLS handshake is terminated
without sending more messages to the server.
Signed-off-by: Jouni Malinen <j@w1.fi>
Move supplicant to idf and do following refactoring:
1. Make the folder structure consitent with supplicant upstream
2. Remove duplicated header files and minimize the public header files
3. Refactor for WiFi/supplicant interfaces
